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TREATY LAW AND LEGAL TRANSITION COSTS 
MICHAELP. VAN ALSTINE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The dominant currency in contemporary debates over legal re-
form is benefit. That is, and almost by definition, changes in the law 
most often are proposed and adopted based on perceptions of their 
net substantive benefit. They promise, for instance, to remedy an in-
equity or correct some other recognized defect in the existing legal 
order, modernize the law to reflect new social or technological reali-
ties, remove inefficiencies that frustrate desirable forms of human in-
teraction, or (relatedly) harmonize inconsistent rules across juris-
dictions. 
This traditional focus on substantive benefits and costs-al-
though of course important on its own plane-overlooks the 
transitional friction associated with legal change itself. As I argued in 
a recent article, 1 a legal system can experience substantial friction 
simply in accommodating the existence of new legal norms. Broadly, 
these "legal transition costs" arise from the need to learn about the 
content of new legal norms and the uncertainty and error costs that 
flow from the loss of the accrued experience with the old legal regime 
as well as from contending with doubts about the new one. Signifi-
cantly, these costs of accommodating new legal norms will arise-
although in differing degrees in different contexts- irrespective of the 
substantive policy goals the new norms pursue and of the particular 
regulatory vehicle by which they come into being-whether by 
statute, administrative regulation, treaty, or otherwise. 
The phenomenon of legal transition costs thus applies to the 
adoption of new international legal norms as well. Indeed, there is 
reason to believe that the internationalization of the law poses special 
problems, in particular with regard to new multilateral treaty law 
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norms designed to regulate the rights and obligations of private ac-
tors. Among other things, the complexity of the multinational law-
making process may heighten the risk of indeterminacy with new 
international private law norms. As well, the interaction with the 
preexisting national law may spawn difficult questions of norm hier-
archy. These problems are only compounded by the fact (at least in 
the present political configuration) that uniform international private 
law norms must be interpreted and applied by disparate national 
courts. Controversies may even arise-as is evidenced by recent 
scholarly debates in this country2-about whether private law norms 
properly may be the subject of an international treaty, as opposed to 
more traditional forms of domestic legislation. 
These questions also play an integral role in the theme of this 
Symposium, "Constructing International Intellectual Property Law: 
The Role of National Courts." My goal in this Article is to offer 
some initial observations on the role transition cost analysis should 
play in the continuing development of international private law, in-
cluding international intellectual property law. More specifically, I 
will suggest here that concerns about the transitional friction associ-
ated with the integration of new international norms into the broader 
web of the law also apply to the more specific subject of the Sympo-
sium, the draft treaty on jurisdiction and enforcement of intellectual 
property judgments prepared by Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and 
Jane Ginsburg.3 
As we shall see below, however, the message of transition cost 
analysis is not a negative one. That is, a recognition that the costs of 
legal transitions are real and can be substantial does not mean that 
there is something inherently inefficient about legal change. Rather, 
transition cost analysis focuses attention beyond the traditional cur-
rency of substantive benefits and costs to the importance of the as-
similation of new legal norms as well. The analysis thus underscores 
for lawmakers that a sensitivity to the phenomenon of legal transition 
costs can facilitate both the acceptance and effectiveness of legal re-
forms. 
As I examine in the latter half of this Article, such a sensitivity 
will require a more active attention to available drafting and imple-
mentation techniques that can mitigate transitional friction before it 
2. I discuss this controversy in more detail infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
3. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002). 
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arises. Moreover, and more importantly for the subject of this sym-
posium, transition cost analysis highlights for lawmakers the impor-
tant role of "mediating institutions" in ameliorating the transitional 
impact of changes in the law, particularly in the form of new interna-
tional private law norms. We will see below that by facilitating coop-
eration among existing national courts and creating new forms of 
international mediating institutions, lawmakers may substantially 
mitigate the learning, uncertainty, and kindred costs of new private 
law conventions such as that proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and 
Ginsburg for the recognition of international intellectual property 
judgments. 
I. LEGAL TRANSITION COSTS: AN OVERVIEW 
The notion of legal transition costs reflects a simple, but poten-
tially significant, idea: that a legal system will experience transitional 
friction simply in adjusting to the existence of a new positive law 
norm. To set the context for an examination of the implications of 
transition cost analysis for the continuing internationalization of the 
law, this Section will first briefly review the nature of legal transition 
costs and why they are worthy of our attention. 
I have examined in detail elsewhere the distinct sources and 
types of costs that arise from a change in state-created legal regimes.4 
These costs can be distilled into the following principal categories: (1) 
the learning costs associated with determining the content of new le-
gal norms; (2) the uncertainty costs that arise from the absence of 
authoritative determinations about the meaning and effect of new 
norms; (3) the effects of a likely increase in error costs through mis-
takes in their articulation and later interpretation; ( 4) private adjust-
ment costs, both intra-party and inter-party, which arise from the 
need of private actors to adapt their forms and practices to accom-
modate new law; and (5) the parallel transition costs incurred by 
courts and other public institutions in contending with new legal 
norms. Although for ease of exposition there is a value in organizing 
the analysis around these rough categories, as the following brief 
summary indicates there may be substantial interaction and overlap 
between the various forms of legal transition costs. 
4. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 816-50. 
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A. Learning Costs 
In our increasingly detailed and complicated modern legal envi-
ronment, the most basic of legal transition costs are learning costs.5 
Legal actors must identify what rules of law are relevant to their af-
fairs; they must study the scope and content of the applicable ones; 
and they must master the details of the law's more complex and tech-
nical provisions. Most often, of course, legal actors do not incur these 
costs through direct investigation; rather, they find-at least those 
with the resources and desire to do so6 - that it is more efficient to 
consult experts (lawyers, accountants, and the like) with specialized 
education and experience in the law. 
Over time, the learning costs for a given body of law are likely to 
decrease, as interpretive opinions and scholarly analyses add coher-
ence to the law and legal actors gain familiarity with its content.7 
Moreover, as familiarity grows, the interaction among the various le-
gal actors in a legal community can lead to a dispersion of the collec-
tive learning benefits accumulated by all.8 
Nonetheless, even in this collective sense the process involved in 
learning the law involves costs, both in direct financial terms and in 
the dedication of time and effort. In turn, whenever the state deter-
mines to change the law-whether through the revision of existing 
norms or the introduction of new ones- the result will be a new 
round of learning costs for all affected legal actors, and in the aggre-
gate for the legal system as a whole. Among other things, affected le-
gal actors confronted with a new body of legal norms will have to sort 
out questions of scope and effect, master new complexities, and re-
solve the interaction both with the old legal regime and with related 
bodies of law. To be sure, the amount of such costs will vary in rela-
5. For a more detailed analysis of the learning costs of new law, see Van Alstine, supra 
note 1, at 816-22. 
6. A failure to learn the law relevant to one's activities bears its own risks. See id. at 847-
50 (discussing this phenomenon in terms of "ignorance costs"). 
7. A variety of public and private institutions also contribute to a dispersion of knowledge 
about the law. The most notable in this regard are the public judiciary, through their published 
legal opinions, and legal educators, through their publication of treatises and other scholarly 
works. See id. at 817-18 (examining in more detail the contribution of these and similar 
institutions in decreasing the learning costs of new law). 
8. See id. at 818-19; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 
736-40 (1997) (analyzing dispersion of accumulated learning benefits among legal actors with 
regard to commonly used contractual terms); Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform 
Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 692-93 (1999) (examining the benefits that flow from prior 
learning about the law). 
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tion to the ambition, complexity, and precision of the law reform 
project. Nonetheless, the learning costs of new legal norms are real 
and will be incurred by all participants in a legal system, from lay ac-
tors to legal professionals, and even to judges and other adjudicators. 
The phenomenon of learning costs also applies with the introduc-
tion of new international private law norms. Indeed, even at this 
most basic form of transition costs there is reason to believe that the 
impact may be more pronounced in the international law context. As 
experience in this country with at least one existing private law treaty 
suggests,9 there may be a comparative lack of familiarity by legal 
practitioners of the precise nature and effect of treaty law, and even 
of its existence. 10 
These special concerns suggest that particular care is warranted 
in the preparation and implementation of new international treaty 
law, such as that proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this Article, the goal of transition 
cost analysis is to focus attention on the impact of undisciplined legal 
change, even with norms that promise significant substantive benefits. 
The potential for enhanced learning costs with new international pri-
vate law norms only heightens for lawmakers the importance of their 
role at the drafting stage in addressing legal transition costs before 
they arise. 
9. The treaty referred to here is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, which the United States ratified in 1986. See Final Act of the 
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Conference 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), republished 
at 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) [hereinafter CISG]. Although the Treaty has been in effect for over 
a decade and has been accepted by over sixty countries, there is a surprising lack of knowledge 
about its existence. See, e.g., James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International 
Sales, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 273, 280 (1999) ("[M]any U.S. businesses, lawyers and courts have 
yet to realize that contracts they assume are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
are actually governed by the CISG. The dearth of U.S. case law concerning the CISG despite its 
ten years of applicability to the majority of U.S. international sales transactions is itself evidence 
of the lack of awareness of the CISG in the United States." (footnote omitted)). 
10. Concerns about the effect of the learning costs have even led one scholar to question 
whether excessive novelty in the U.N. Sales Convention may compromise its ultimate success. 
See Walt, supra note 8, at 698-705 (suggesting that the costs of learning the CISG as well as the 
inability of transactors to internalize the learning benefits they confer through public 
litigation-which he discusses in terms of a "learning externality"-may lead transactors to opt 
out of its application and thus compromise the law's goal of fostering international uniformity). 
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B. Uncertainty Costs 
The adoption of international legal norms in the form of a treaty 
also may pose special concerns with regard to uncertainty costs. Al-
though they often run in parallel with the costs of learning new law, 
uncertainty costs are conceptually different and ultimately more sig-
nificant.11 
Uncertainty costs arise from the simple fact that even after the 
most detailed and careful examination of new legal norms a variety of 
questions of meaning, scope, and effect are likely to remain. In other 
words, even after a legal system has resolved all that can be learned 
about the new norms, some level of uncertainty likely will remain. 
When, as in the case of a private law treaty, a legal reform also in-
volves regulation at a higher level of social organization,12 the risk of 
uncertainty in the interaction with the existing body of law is particu-
larly acute. 
Uncertainty costs can arise in what might be viewed as back-
ward-looking and forward-looking forms. The former involve the loss 
of the accumulated certainty in a given field of law. The focus here is 
principally on the value of interpretive precedent. Whenever a 
competent court issues an interpretive ruling on a disputed issue of 
law, the resultant increase in certainty in the law in effect reflects a 
public good-a benefit that is accessible by all members of a legal sys-
tem, but is exhaustible by none.13 Interpretive precedent can clarify 
ambiguous legal norms, bring cohesion to a large or intricate body of 
law, and resolve issues of norm hierarchy. 14 The cumulative effect of 
this process over time is a progressive enhancement of the certainty in 
a given body of legal norms. 15 Thus, when the state decides to replace 
11. For a more detailed analysis of the uncertainty costs of new law, see Van Alstine, supra 
note 1, at 822-35. 
12. For an analysis of this point, see Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory 
Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 49 (1993) (observing that 
cooperation among formally sovereign states at the international level "constrains horizontal 
competition and is equivalent to a move up the scale of social organization to 
institutionalization (or regulation) at a higher level of social organization"). 
13. For a review of these key attributes of a public good in the context of intellectual 
property law, see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241,261 n.96 (1998) (describing a public good as one that is "non-
excludable," which means that one user cannot exclude use by others, and "non-rivalrous," 
which means that the use of the good by one person does not diminish its availability for others) 
and Clarisa Long, Patents & Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 229, 231 (2000) 
(describing the same attributes). 
14. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 824-28. 
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an established body of law with a new and untested one, it risks 
wasting a valuable societal investment. 
This aspect of uncertainty costs may be of less concern, however, 
for the particular legal reforms proposed by the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg 
treaty. The very problem that this proposed treaty is designed to ad-
dress is the absence of an effective legal infrastructure for the recog-
nition and enforcement of intellectual property judgments.16 The 
proposed treaty would not displace an established legal regime, but 
rather fill a gap in international intellectual property law. There is, in 
other words, no established body of international norms in the field 
that would be compromised by the adoption of the proposed 
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty. To be sure, there exists a rough patchwork 
of national rules and procedures for the local enforcement of judg-
ments; and there may be limited aspects of the existing rules that may 
be worthy of express adoption.17 Nonetheless, because the existing 
system is beset by substantial doubts with regard to the enforcement 
of international intellectual property judgments, the Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg treaty is unlikely to compromise in any material way the ac-
cumulated certainty in the field. 
In contrast, the adoption of new legal norms through the mecha-
nism of a treaty may risk the imposition of substantial uncertainty 
costs when viewed ex ante. That is, apart from the backward-looking 
loss of accumulated legal certainty, the adoption of new legal norms 
represents a new moment for uncertainty about their precise meaning 
and effect. 
This forward-looking component of uncertainty may impose 
costs on legal actors in a variety of ways. Without authoritative inter-
pretation of ambiguous provisions, legal actors will incur increased 
planning costs to address the expanded range of possible meanings. 
A similar effect on legal professionals will decrease the reliability of 
expert legal advice, and thus increase the risk of definitive action. 
Derivatively, the uncertainty associated with a new legal regime may 
15. This is a well-recognized benefit of legal precedent. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contract, 81 VA. L. REV. 757,777 (1995) (noting 
that "scholars writing from a variety of perspectives have observed that precedents in general 
reduce the uncertainty of the legal rule they interpret"). But see Anthony D'Amato, Legal 
Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) (observing that a proliferation of bodies with the 
authority to issue interpretive rulings on a single issue may lead to an increase in uncertainty). 
16. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 1065-66 (describing the benefits of a single 
international jurisdiction and judgments convention). 
17. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing the value of reaping the 
accrued certainty of the existing legal order). 
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lead to increased dispute resolution costs, both from an expansion of 
the universe of potential disputes and from a decrease in the likeli-
hood of their extrajudicial settlement. 1s 
These forward-looking uncertainty costs will vary in direct rela-
tion to the precision of the legal norm at issue. Narrow, rigid rules, 
for example, are likely to involve relatively limited uncertainty costs. 
In contrast, flexible, open-ended standards may leave considerable 
postadoption uncertainty. Because norms in this form take on func-
tional content only through progressive judicial application over time, 
upon their initial adoption substantial room likely will remain for dis-
putes over their intended application. 19 
The ready message from an appreciation of these uncertainty 
costs is that increased care in the articulation of new legal norms can 
provide significant benefits for affected legal actors. This point is par-
ticularly significant with regard to transjurisdictional legal reform.20 
Because responsibility for interpretation and application remains with 
the disparate national courts, there is, among other problems, no sin-
gle institution with the power to render authoritative judgments on 
18. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 830-32 (discussing the increased negotiation and 
dispute resolution costs that attend legal uncertainty). 
19. This does not mean that narrow rules should always be the preferred structure for new 
legal norms. Among other things, a recognition of a need for situational flexibility or of the 
benefits of a gradual evolution and development by courts in a field of law over time may 
suggest that standards are the better normative model. By focusing on the relative costs of 
transition between the two options, transition cost analysis also may inform the continuing 
debate over the choice between rules and standards. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, 
supra note 1, at 832-34. 
20. There is also a more fundamental concern about private law treaties, but it is one over 
which lawmakers may have little control. Recent and heated scholarly controversies about the 
precise nature of treaties in our domestic legal system create what might be called "meta-
uncertainty costs." Some scholars have argued that there are important limitations on the 
substantive matters that properly may be the subject of treaties. See Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998) (arguing that the 
substantive limitations in the interstate commerce clause also limit the power of the federal 
government with regard to treaties). But see David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: 
The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
1075 (2000) (offering a comprehensive challenge to Professor Bradley's argument). Separately, 
Professor John Yoo has argued that the Constitution entirely prohibits self-executing treaties 
(those that take effect without implementation by congressional legislation), or at least on 
matters within Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the 
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1955, 2092 (1999) (suggesting the possibility of such an approach). As an alternative, he has 
suggested that there should at least be a presumption against self-execution. I d. at 2093-94; see 
John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-
Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2220 (1999) (describing this approach as a "soft" rule 
under which courts should require the treatymakers "to issue a clear statement if they want a 
treaty to be self-executing"). But see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2154,2157-58 (1999) (disagreeing with Professor Yoo's conclusions). 
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uncertain provisions. As a result, there may be more serious struc-
tural impediments, as compared to domestic law norms, to a timely 
and effective reduction in the uncertainty costs of new multilateral 
treaty law. I will have more to say on this point below.21 It suffices at 
this stage in the analysis to observe that an antidote to uncertainty 
costs is to enhance the effectiveness of "mediating institutions" in 
speeding the resolution of the difficult interpretive issues that arise 
from the adoption of new legal norms. 
C. Error Costs 
Another form of legal transition costs arises from the risk of er-
ror in the adoption of new legal norms. A close, but particularly per-
nicious, relative of uncertainty costs, such error costs issue from 
imperfections in the articulation or mistakes in the application of new 
law. Once again, this does not mean that there is something inher-
ently suspect about legal change; it simply means that the adoption of 
new norms represents a new moment for error in their initial formula-
tion or subsequent interpretation.22 
The errors that attend legal transitions can be corrected, of 
course. For instance, subsequent legislative review and amendment 
can cure mistakes in the articulation of new legal norms-such as the 
commonplace formulation errors of unintended incompleteness, 
overbreadth, or inconsistency. Active judicial examination of back-
ground and context likewise can make sense of otherwise faulty leg-
islative signals. In a similar way, improvident interpretive decisions 
by courts or administrative bodies can be corrected through subse-
quent reexamination or through review by superior courts. On most 
issues of law, legislative bodies have the power to do the same. 
Such errors associated with the adoption of new legal norms 
nonetheless impose costs on affected legal actors, and thus on the le-
gal system as a whole. Most notably, legislative formulations or judi-
cial interpretations later discovered to be faulty can cause legal actors 
to make wasteful investments. Moreover, error correction itself in-
volves costs. In addition to the public resources necessary to review 
and correct the error, there will be increased public and private dis-
21. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text. 
22. For a more detailed analysis of the error costs of new law, see Van Alstine, supra note 
1, at 845-50. 
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pute resolution costs as the erroneous signals foment avoidable litiga-
tion. 
Once again, there is reason to believe that the problem of error 
costs may be particularly acute with the adoption of new international 
legal regimes. First, the difficulty of formulating precise legal man-
dates, manifest even in our relatively stable legal system, is com-
pounded when the mandates arise from and are intended to govern 
disparate legal and political cultures. The heterogeneity of the par-
ticipants in the lawmaking process, the difficulty of effective commu-
nication, and the need to translate legal concepts into different 
official languages increase the challenges for the drafters of transna-
tional norms.23 
Moreover, and perhaps of greater concern, the means of effective 
legislative correction of drafting errors are substantially circum-
scribed with new multinational legal regimes because revision of an 
international treaty requires the renewed consent of each member 
state to the original treaty. As a result, even where feasible, the proc-
ess for the amendment of a multilateral treaty that is already in force 
is likely to be a long and arduous one. 
The impact of judicial error in the subsequent interpretation of 
multilateral treaties, in particular those of a private law nature, raises 
equal challenges. Unlike unified legal systems, there exists no final 
arbiter for the interpretation of such a treaty. (Indeed, this Sympo-
sium, which is directed to the role of national courts in constructing 
international intellectual property law, in no small measure arises out 
of a recognition of this fundamental problem.) As a result, multilat-
eral treaties designed to unify the law in fact may carry their own 
seeds of potential disunity, as the means of international redress for 
an erroneous interpretation by one national court will be severely 
limited. 
These concerns again highlight the importance of sensitivity to 
the potential for increased error costs in the adoption of new interna-
tional norms such as those proposed by the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty. 
The ready point is that the difficult lawmaking process for multina-
tional treaties mandates increased care in formulation in order to 
23. Professor John Honnold's observation about the challenges of uniform international 
law is particularly apt in this regard: "{Wjords [are] mushy, ambiguous things even for ordinary 
communications .... International unification of law raises these difficulties to a higher power." 
John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action- Uniform International Words: Uniform 
Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 207 (1988). 
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avoid or mitigate the impact of drafting errors. With regard to the 
risks of interpretive error, the difficulties that arise from a system of 
national courts are not insurmountable. Instead, as I will examine 
below, this problem only underscores the importance of examining 
other forms of mediating institutions designed to assist in the effective 
assimilation of new international legal norms. 
D. Private Adjustment Costs 
The costs of transition between legal regimes also include the 
impact on private practices that have developed within the frame-
work of the old legal order. Any body of law designed to regulate 
continuing activity-if applied by authorities with consistency over 
time-also will facilitate the development of private conventions de-
signed to implement, supplement, and (where allowed) adjust the 
positive law norms. The adoption of new substantive international 
norms to regulate continuing private behavior may of course also oc-
casion this form of legal transition costs.24 As I will note below, how-
ever, private adjustment costs may be of less concern for targeted 
procedural rules, such as the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty. A 
complete understanding of the phenomenon of legal transition costs 
nonetheless mandates a brief examination of private adjustment 
costs.25 
One of the benefits of stability in the law is that it can stimulate 
private actors to develop efficient standardized conventions to regu-
late their affairs in the interstices of the law. For individuals or single 
firms, this standardization takes the form of cost-saving administra-
tive practices and forms designed for multiple or repeat use. Simi-
larly, certainty and stability in the law can speed the development of 
networks of efficient interparty contacts, especially standardized con-
tractual formulations.26 Like intraparty forms, these networks oper-
ate to complement or fine-tune the express provisions of positive law. 
24. A good example of this is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods. CISG, supra note 9. This international private law treaty 
comprehensively regulates the rights and obligations of buyers and sellers involved in defined 
international sales transactions. See id. art. 4. 
25. For a more detailed analysis of the private adjustment costs often associated with a 
change in the law, see Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 836-45. 
26. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 8, at 763-64 (analyzing the role of the law in 
facilitating the creation of private networks of standardized contractual terms); Charles J. Goetz 
& Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between 
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 286-88 (1985) (examining the value 
of state supplied background rules in facilitating the development of networks of standardized 
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Such intra- and interparty standardization is beneficial for pri-
vate actors in a variety of ways. Among other things, the distillation 
of accumulated experience into a permanent form creates learning 
benefits, decreases application errors, and frees transactors from the 
resource costs of crafting individualized solutions for each new trans-
action. The development of private conventions, however, involves 
significant transaction costs. Most important, these include the re-
source costs of the time, effort, and risk associated with developing, 
testing, and revising a form or practice over time. 
When the state decides to alter the legal environment, therefore, 
adjustment costs will arise from the impact on these private conven-
tions. In other words, just as stability in the law can facilitate the de-
velopment of efficient standardized forms and practices, a change in 
the positive law can compromise them. The net effect is the imposi-
tion of private legal transition costs from the loss of the accrued bene-
fits of the established conventions and the resource costs of 
developing new ones. 
It would appear that, because it is designed principally to facili-
tate a single legal act-the recognition and enforcement of interna-
tional intellectual property judgments- the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty 
should not raise significant concerns about private adjustment costs. 
Even here, to be sure, a variety of forms will need to be developed to 
ensure the efficient application of legal rules that the treaty would in-
troduce, the costs of which will be borne not only by private transac-
tors but also by public institutions.27 Nonetheless, it is likely-in 
particular given that such a treaty in large measure will fill a gap in 
the existing legal infrastructure-that private adjustment costs should 
not be as significant a concern for the targeted judgments convention 
under consideration here. 
E. Public Legal Transition Costs 
Legal transition costs are not only a private phenomenon. Be-
cause the state is involved not only in the creation of law, but in its 
administration and application as well, public institutions also may in-
cur the transition costs associated with legal change.28 This is par-
contract terms). 
27. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. 
28. For a more detailed analysis of the notion of public transition costs, see Van Alstine, 
supra note 1, at 850-52. 
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ticularly true with legal norms that will involve public institutions, 
such as the jurisdiction and judgment rules proposed by the Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg treaty. Here, the focal point for disputes over the applica-
tion of the law of necessity will be public institutions, specifically 
national court systems. 
Public court systems in effect represent an elaborate state sub-
sidy for the resolution of societal disputes. Because of this involve-
ment in dispute resolution, the public legal transition costs associated 
with the adoption of new law will parallel those for private actors. 
Learning costs, for instance, will arise from the need of state judicial 
officers (especially those in courts of general jurisdiction)29 to master 
the new law. A failure to do so may lead to more prolonged and 
error-prone proceedings. Moreover, a likely consequence of the un-
certainty that often attends the introduction of new legal norms is an 
increase in the frequency of disputes (both legitimate and specious )30 
and a decrease in the likelihood of their extrajudicial settlement.31 In 
a similar way, the likely increase in interpretive error-which is par-
ticularly problematic with multilateral treaties32 -also will foment 
avoidable litigation. Through the litigation infrastructure provided by 
its court system, the state itself will bear an appreciable part of the 
costs of this increased activity. 
Most often, these public transition costs are a mere second-tier 
consequence of the uncertainty costs that private actors must bear in 
contending with new legal norms. In the case of procedural rules 
such as the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty, however, the state 
court system is the very subject of regulation. Disputes over jurisdic-
tion and over the propriety of the recognition or enforcement of 
29. This effect may be diminished substantially when an area of the law is entrusted to 
courts of special jurisdiction. For example, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals with its 
specialized jurisdiction for matters of patent law (among other things) and the Delaware Court 
of Chancery for corporate law matters are more likely to follow developments in their 
respective fields and thus have a shorter learning curve for relevant changes in the law. For a 
discussion of why a greater reliance on specialized courts might decrease the costs of legal 
transitions, see infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
30. Uncertainty in the law also may increase the likelihood of opportunism, for as doubt 
about the precise content of the law grows, so too will the latitude for dubious claims masked as 
legitimate argumentation. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 835-36. Cf 
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521-
22 (1981) (examining the phenomenon of "subtle opportunism" in contractual relationships, and 
noting that, because it is difficult to detect and is easily masked as legitimate conduct, it is 
"discoverable only at a high cost"). 
31. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
32. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the increased likelihood and 
consequences of interpretive error for multilateral treaties). 
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judgments will necessarily involve the public court system. As a re-
sult, the adoption of such a treaty will involve direct learning, uncer-
tainty, and error costs for state judicial officers. Moreover, because of 
the state court systems' direct role in application, such a jurisdiction 
and enforcement treaty will impose drafting and administrative 
adjustment costs on them that parallel the costs private actors often 
bear in adapting their affairs to new legal norms.33 
In short, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty presents a particularly 
stark example of the public transition costs that can arise from legal 
change. It thus highlights the importance of a sensitivity to the phe-
nomenon of legal transition costs for public institutions as well.34 In 
other words, this public aspect again focuses attention on the need to 
attend not only to the substantive value of new legal norms, but also 
to their efficient assimilation into the broader web of the law. I now 
turn to this important message of transition cost analysis. 
II. THE POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION COST ANALYSIS 
FOR THE PROPOSED liP JUDGMENTS TREATY 
The adoption of new legal norms can bring substantial societal 
benefits. In addition to advancing important social causes, legal 
change can facilitate socially desirable human activities or otherwise 
diminish the transaction costs that inhibit valuable economic transac-
tions. Indeed, the uniform law movement, both domestically and in-
ternationally, represents one of the best examples of the ability of 
new legal norms to remove some of the impediments to valuable 
forms of human interchange.35 The very purpose of uniform legal 
rules across jurisdictions is to minimize the learning costs concerning 
the content of foreign law, clear away uncertainties over the identifi-
cation of applicable law, and create a uniform and stable legal frame-
33. See supra notes 24--27 and accompanying text. 
34. One benefit of this direct state involvement in the application of the proposed treaty is 
that it may decrease the effect of "fiscal illusion." This describes the likely tendency of 
lawmakers to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of legal reforms. See Louis 
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 567 (1989) 
(describing this phenomenon). 
35. For more on these benefits of uniform law, see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996) 
(discussing the efficiency gains potentially offered by uniform rules across different 
jurisdictions); David Charney, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law 
Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 442, 445-46 (1991) (discussing same regarding the specific subject of 
international corporate law). 
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work to facilitate cross-border transactions. The proposed 
international intellectual property judgments treaty-like the broader 
Hague Judgments Convention under negotiation36-also promises to 
decrease the transaction costs associated with the enforcement of liP 
judgments and thereby enhance the value of the substantive norms of 
international intellectual property law. 
A recognition of the phenomenon of legal transition costs does 
not challenge these substantive benefits of legal change. Rather, the 
basic message is that without effective accommodation, transitional 
friction may compromise the value of new legal norms, perhaps sub-
stantially so. In the worst case, by fomenting avoidable litigation and 
in creating excessive legal uncertainty, substantively beneficial but 
undisciplined legal change may do more harm than good. 
My goal in the Section to follow is to offer some initial observa-
tions on how the legal transition costs associated with the proposed 
international judgments convention might be mitigated, and thus how 
the drafters and scholars might address the source of some opposition 
to its adoption. As we shall see below, lawmakers have at their dis-
posal a variety of means by which they can prospectively address the 
transitional impact of new law. 
A. Mitigating Legal Transition Costs 
Transition cost analysis underscores for lawmakers that they 
have a role not only in the creation of new law but also in its effective 
assimilation and application by the legal system as a whole. The prin-
cipal means of doing so is through increased diligence at the drafting 
stage. The ready point here is that increased care in the structuring 
and articulation of new legal norms can prospectively mitigate the as-
sociated learning costs, decrease the amount of uncertainty, and avoid 
harmful formulation errors. In so doing, lawmakers in effect inter-
nalize the legal transition costs of new norms ex ante. 
Indeed, this enhanced role of lawmakers may be particularly im-
portant with regard to new international legal norms. A simple lack 
of familiarity with the treaty-making process, together with the fact 
that treaties often reflect an amalgam of foreign legal concepts, in-
creases the likely extent and impact of transition costs. By the same 
36. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, drafts at http://www.hcch. 
net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (Oct. 30, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Draft Hague Convention]. 
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token, these considerations increase the importance of addressing the 
transitional friction associated with new treaty law at the drafting 
stageY In this light, the already long and deliberate process in the 
negotiation of the parallel Hague Judgments Convention may be a 
positive, even if for some a frustrating, sign. 
The particular characteristics of new treaty law also counsels 
more active consideration of meta-approaches to legal transition 
costs. The first of these is the inclusion of express rules of interpreta-
tion. The preliminary draft of the Hague Judgments Convention-
following the lead of earlier private law conventions38 -wisely 
includes an express directive that in interpretive inquiries national 
courts must have regard for its "international character" and "the 
need to promote uniformity in its application."39 I have elsewhere 
emphasized the importance of such express rules of interpretation in 
international private law conventions.40 In the context of legal transi-
tion costs, such express directives can broaden the field of available 
materials in learning the law and thus lessen the likelihood and im-
pact of interpretive error. 
Separately, much is to be gained from expressly addressing the 
role of national courts in filling gaps in an international convention's 
regulatory scheme. By doing so, drafters can prospectively resolve 
thorny questions over the hierarchy of norms, specifically whether na-
tional courts are empowered to construct conforming additions to in-
ternational legal regimes or resort to otherwise-applicable (and 
nonuniform) national law. Whether an expansionist or restrictive ap-
proach is chosen,41 a failure to do so can substantially increase uncer-
37. These concerns are enhanced with complex, multilayered legal systems such as that in 
the United States. The uneven experience in this country with one private law convention that 
elsewhere has been quite successful-the United Nations Sales Law Convention-accentuates 
the value of clear legislative signals in the drafting and implementation of new international 
norms. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (observing the lack of familiarity with the CISG 
in the United States); infra note 54 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties courts in this 
country have had in understanding their interpretive role for the Convention). 
38. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 9, art. 7(1); UNIDROIT Convention on International 
Financial Leasing, art. 6(1), May 28, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 922, 933-34 (1988); 
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, art. 4(1), May 28, 1988, reprinted in 27 
I.L.M. 922, 945 (1988). 
39. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 38(1). 
40. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 
731-34 (1998). 
41. There may be sound reasons for a more restrictive approach for procedural rules such 
as those contemplated in the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty. For private law treaties 
whose purpose is to regulate the rights and obligations of private parties in specific fields in a 
comprehensive fashion, such as in the case of the United Nations Sales Convention, long-term 
success may depend substantially on the power of courts to develop existing rules to cover 
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tainty and error costs associated with an avoidable problem that has 
perennially plagued courts in this country in resolving the interaction 
between federal and state law. 
Along the same line, transition cost analysis highlights for inter-
national norms the importance of reaping the accumulated certainty 
in the resolution of specific normative issues.42 That is, where a new 
body of law covers the same subject matter as (or is merely a revision 
of) an existing one, drafters may prospectively mitigate transition 
costs by carefully addressing-either through express approval or re-
jection-the experience gained with the existing normative solutions 
and the related interpretive precedent. The result of such a practice 
is to avoid much of the learning, uncertainty, and kindred costs of the 
new legal norms. 
At certain points, the commentary of the proposed Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg treaty purports to do just that, by referring to existing na-
tional practice on certain issues.43 From the perspective of legal 
transition costs, this approach is to be lauded. Indeed, such refer-
ences to past experience are particularly important for legal norms 
structured as open-ended standards rather than narrowly tailored 
rules.44 In order to reap the full benefits of the accumulated certainty 
on such issues, however, the commentary should make clear the ex-
tent to which the referenced past interpretive precedent is binding or 
merely persuasive in the interpretation of the proposed new interna-
tional norms. 
unforeseen technological, social, or other changes in the field. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 
40, at 761-91 (arguing that an expansive approach to the general principles gap-filling 
methodology in the U.N. Sales Convention is appropriate to ensure its long-term success). A 
more restrictive approach may be appropriate, in contrast, for a more technical treaty such as 
the statute of limitations treaty that is a companion to the U.N. Sales Convention. See id., at 
730-31 n.178 (offering this observation) (citing Convention on the Limitation Period in the 
International Sale of Goods, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 952 (1974), and Protocol Amending the 
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, Annex II, reprinted in 
19 I.L.M. 696 (1980)). 
42. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 860 (observing that legal transition costs can be 
mitigated by expressly addressing the continuing effect of past interpretative precedent in the 
adoption of new legal norms). 
43. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 16, cmt. at 1115 (noting that the approach in 
article 9 "is derived from US federal jurisdiction law, 28 U.S.C. § 1367"); id. arts. 1, 2 & cmt. at 
1096 (stating that "line drawing" with regard to scope of the Draft Convention would be 
difficult but noting that "experiences in national judicial systems may be helpful" and citing 
certain precedent from the United States); id. at 1070-71 (noting with regard to consolidation 
that "(b]oth US and European laws have mechanisms to promote consolidation, and the 
techniques of both systems are invoked here"). 
44. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 833-35 (discussing the special value of interpretive 
precedent for legal norms structured as standards). 
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This brings us to the potentially important role of the Dreyfuss-
Ginsburg commentary itself. For purposes of transition cost analysis, 
there is much to recommend an official commentary to guide the in-
terpretation and application of a new body of law. The official com-
ments appended to each of the sections of the Uniform Commercial 
Code in this country provide a positive model in this regard.45 
Though only persuasive, these official comments have served to assist 
in the learning of the law, decrease uncertainty costs, and limit in-
stances of interpretive error. Given the complexities inherent in in-
terpretation by disparate national courts, a concern for the effects of 
legal transition costs counsels strongly in favor of a similar instrument 
(along the lines of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg commentary) for a new in-
ternational private law treaty.46 
B. Enhancing the Role of Mediating Institutions in the Development 
of International Private Law 
A final step in understanding the true impact of legal transition 
costs is to recognize the important role of "mediating institutions" in 
the assimilation of new legal normsY Traditionally, the most promi-
nent mediating institution has been the public court system. Through 
their published (and thus public) interpretive opinions, state courts 
can assist in the learning of the law by the public at large, speed the 
clarification of legal uncertainties, and add coherence to comprehen-
sive or complicated bodies of law. Indeed, as we have seen, by clari-
fying and disseminating knowledge about the law, state court 
interpretive decisions in effect represent public goods.48 As should be 
readily apparent at this point in the analysis, the net effect of these 
functions of state courts is to diminish the learning, uncertainty, and 
kindred costs associated with the adoption of new legal norms. 
45. For a discussion of the role of the Official Comments to the U.C.C., see generally 
Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 
WIS. L. REV. 597 (discussing the background and purpose for the Official Comments). See also 
Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 565-66 (2000) (noting that the purpose of the 
comments was to provide detailed guidance to the courts in applying the Code). 
46. Interests of certainty suggest, however, that the drafters expressly resolve the precise 
force of such a commentary. Specifically, the drafters should clarify whether the "official" 
commentary should operate in lieu of, or merely as a hierarchically superior supplement to, the 
drafting history (commonly known as the travaux preparatoires). 
47. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 862-68 (comprehensively addressing the role of 
mediating institutions with regard to legal transition costs). 
48. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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The effectiveness of state courts in their traditional role as medi-
ating institutions may be diminished, however, for multilateral private 
law treaties. Because responsibility for the application of such trea-
ties rests with the disparate national courts of the member states, 
there is no single institution empowered to render final, authoritative 
interpretations on disputed issues. This problem is compounded in 
this country because the already overburdened national Supreme 
Court is unlikely to have the capacity or inclination to provide final 
national guidance on such private law issues except in rare circum-
stances.49 Moreover, the presence of multiple equally authoritative 
interpretations increases the likelihood of inconsistent interpretations 
for multilateral private law treaties.50 These special complications for 
multilateral treaties suggest a need to enhance the effectiveness of 
existing mediating institutions and consider the creation of new ones. 
The first, and perhaps easiest, measure in this regard would be to 
mandate more effective interaction between national courts on inter-
pretive inquiries. This mandate could take the form of an express 
directive-such as the one contemplated in the preliminary draft of 
the proposed Hague Judgments Convention51 -directing national 
courts to give appropriate deference to prior interpretive decisions by 
courts in other member states. Such an express directive is an impor-
tant supplement to the common instruction in private law treaties that 
courts should have regard for the interests of uniformity of inter-
pretation.52 Although the deference to prior interpretive decisions is 
implicit in such a uniformity directive,53 the record of courts in this 
country has been less than exemplary in this regard.54 An express di-
49. I have more to say on this point infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
50. Cf. D'Amato, supra note 15, at 10 (suggesting that an increase in potentially 
inconsistent interpretive precedent can lead to an increase in uncertainty). 
51. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 38(2) ("The courts of each 
Contracting State shall, when applying and interpreting the Convention, take due account of the 
case law of other Contracting States."). 
52. See supra note 38 (citing the uniformity directive in other private law treaties). 
53. See Van Alstine, supra note 40, at 732 (arguing with regard to a similar provision in the 
UN Sales Convention that "[i]mplicit in the required deference to uniformity is an instruction to 
adjudicators to give mutual deference to prior interpretive decisions by courts of other member 
states"); id. at 786-91 (exploring this point in greater detail). 
54. With regard to the United Nations Sales Convention, for example, there are already 
over 850 reported decisions on its application and interpretation by courts in the various 
member states. For a compilation of such cases, see the CISG Case Schedule at http://www.cisg. 
law.pace.edu/cisg/text/-casesschedule.html (last visited March 13, 2002). In spite of this, courts 
in the United States continue to express the view that "there is virtually no case law under the 
Convention." See Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995); 
see also Supermicro Computer, Inc. v. Digitechnic, S.A., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (stating that "[t]he case law interpreting and applying the CISG is sparse"); Claudia, 
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rective of appropriate deference, therefore, should enhance the effec-
tiveness of the disparate national courts as mediating institutions for 
multilateral treaties. 
To support this interaction between national courts, the interna-
tional institution under whose auspices a new treaty is adopted-the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law in the case of the 
proposed Hague Judgments Convention and the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg 
Draft Convention on Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Prop-
erty Matters-should consider the creation of a mechanism for the 
dissemination of knowledge about interpretive decisions by courts in 
the various member states. A model of such a system is the so-called 
"CLOUT" system (Case Law On UNCITRAL Texts) established by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for pri-
vate law conventions created under its auspices. Under the CLOUT 
system, the Secretariat of UNCITRAL arranges for the collection of 
interpretive decisions, and for the preparation, translation, and dis-
semination of abstracts of the decisions.55 A preliminary draft of the 
Hague Judgments Convention proposes a similar, if less ambitious, 
system.56 A sensitivity to legal transition costs suggests that such a 
system should be adopted for the proposed Dreyfuss-Ginsburg treaty, 
as well as for similar private law conventions. 
A more ambitious measure to address the special obstacles of 
multilateral treaties is the creation of entirely new mediating institu-
tions. One promising option-which follows the model of the Per-
manent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, and has 
already been proposed for the U.N. Sales Convention57 -is the estab-
lishment of a standing committee of experts to oversee the operation 
of a new multilateral treaty after adoption. The purpose of such a 
body would be to monitor developments in the interpretation of the 
treaty, identify particularly contentious interpretive issues, propose 
S.N.C. v. Olivieri Footware, Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 164824, *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 7, 1998) (stating same); Helen Kaminski Pty., Ltd. v. Mktg. Australian Prods., Inc., Nos. M-
47 (DLC), 96B46519, 97-8072A, 1997 WL 414137, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 1997) (asserting that 
there is "little to no case law on the CISG in general"). 
55. The information collected under the CLOUT system can be found at the homepage of 
UNCITRAL at http://www.uncitral.org/englishlclout/index.htm (last visited March 13, 2002). 
56. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 39(1). 
57. See Michael Joachim Bone!!, A Proposal for the Establishment of a Permanent Editorial 
Board for the Vienna Sales Convention, in INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE 241 
(1988); see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Neglect of CISG-A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & 
COM. 365 (1998) (supporting this suggestion). 
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solutions, and, where appropriate, offer nonbinding interpretive 
opinions. 58 
Another option in the same vein is the creation of ad hoc panels 
of experts to respond to inquiries in specific disputes. An innovative 
proposal in this regard is contained in a preliminary draft of the pro-
posed Hague Judgments Convention. Article 40 of that convention 
empowers the permanent bureau of the Hague Conference to estab-
lish a "committee of experts" to respond to inquiries by the parties to 
a dispute or by courts of a member state regarding the interpretation 
of the Convention.59 If such interpretive decisions are made publicly 
available, these ad hoc committees of experts in effect will function as 
a new form of mediating institutions. 
The net effect of all of these suggestions is to assist in the as-
similation of new multilateral treaties. By enhancing the cooperation 
among existing national courts and creating new forms of interna-
tional mediating institutions, lawmakers in effect expand the store-
house of source material for learning about the content of new 
international law, speed the resolution of uncertainties about its pre-
cise meaning and effect, and decrease the likelihood of interpretive 
error. In other words, these new and enhanced forms of mediating 
institutions can more effectively ameliorate the impact of legal transi-
tion costs for new multilateral private law conventions such as that 
proposed by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg for the recognition of 
international intellectual property judgments. 
One final note is appropriate about the effectiveness of mediat-
ing institutions on international law issues in the United States. Be-
cause treaty law is federal law, the only body with the authority to 
provide final, national interpretations on disputed issues is the United 
States Supreme Court. With the continuing expansion of federal law 
in this and other fields, however, the Supreme Court is now increas-
58. A preliminary draft of the proposed Hague Judgments Convention suggests that the 
Secretary General of the Hague Conference establish such a body. See 1999 Draft Hague 
Convention, supra note 36, art. 39(2) (proposing a "special commission" to meet "at regular 
intervals ... to review the operation of the Convention"). Under the proposal, the special 
commission would be empowered to make recommendations "on the application or 
interpretation" of the Hague Judgments Convention and to "propose modifications or revisions 
of the Convention or the addition of protocols," presumably for later consideration by the 
Hague Conference as a whole. See id. art. 39(3). 
59. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 40 (authorizing the permanent 
bureau, "[u]pon a joint request of the parties to a dispute in which the interpretation of the 
Convention is at issue, or of a court of a Contracting State" to assist in the establishment of a 
"committee of experts to make recommendations to such parties or such court"). 
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ingly unlikely to be able to fulfill this function. 60 As scholars of intel-
lectual property are well aware, the one notable exception to this rule 
is the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.61 In matters outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, 
however, one consequence of the continuing expansion of federal law 
(including treaty law) is a likely increase in legal transition costs from 
the increased delay in the national resolution of intercircuit interpre-
tive conflicts. As I argued in The Costs of Legal Change, a fuller ap-
preciation of the impact of legal transition costs should spur more 
active consideration of structural changes to enhance the effective-
ness of national mediating institutions in this country, including in 
particular in the field of treaty lawY 
CONCLUSION 
Like the broader uniform international law movement in gen-
eral, the proposed treaty on jurisdiction and judgments in intellectual 
property matters promises substantial benefits for participants in the 
field. Indeed, by clearing away existing uncertainties and otherwise 
facilitating the enforcement of judgments, the treaty also promises to 
enhance the value of the underlying principles of international intel-
lectual property law itself. As we have seen, however, the adoption 
of new legal norms-in particular in the form of a multilateral 
treaty-also may involve serious transitional costs for the interna-
tional legal system. The message of transition cost analysis is that an 
appropriate sensitivity to these real and potentially substantial legal 
transition costs may ease the assimilation of such beneficial legal re-
forms, and as a result facilitate their acceptance in the first place. 
60. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 864-65 (examining this point in greater detail). 
61. The federal circuit has sole appellate authority, among other things, over matters of 
patent law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). Professor Dreyfuss has offered one of the leading 
examinations of this experiment. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
62. See Van Alstine, supra note 1, at 864-66. 
